Newsletters::2002 August
From R-KIDS of MN and GPF
MN SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
June 13, 2002 Father’s Registry Act Upheld
Heidbreder vs. Carton, affirmed a lower court ruling holding that even though the appellant registered with the Adoption Registry one day late, he was barred from asserting any rights in an adoption proceeding. Three justices dissented. The syllabus for the case reads:
- Birth mother's concealment of her location until 31 days after birth does not excuse a putative father's failure to register with the Minnesota Fathers' Adoption Registry before child is more than 30 days old as required by Minn. Stat. § 259.52 (2000).
- Birth mother's failure to disclose her location to putative father does not constitute fraudulentconcealment because birth mother does not owe a fiduciary duty to provide such information to putative father and thus putative father's claim that birth mother's fraudulent concealment of her location excuses his failure to timely register with the Minnesota Fathers' Adoption Registry fails as a matter of law.
- Putative father cannot maintain paternity action involving child who is the subject of a pending adoption proceeding on theory he substantially complied with the requirement in Minn. Stat. § 259.52 that he register with the Minnesota Fathers' Adoption Registry no later than 30 days after birth of child.
- The requirement in Minn. Stat. § 259.52 that putative father not otherwise entitled to notice of an adoption petition under Minn. Stat. § 259.49 (2000) must register with the Minnesota Fathers' Adoption Registry no later than 30 days after birth of child to assert a claim to a child who is the subject of an adoption petition is not a statute of limitations that can be tolled by fraudulent concealment.
- Putative father is not entitled to equitable relief on theory of promissory estoppel because any reliance on birth mother's statement early in pregnancy that she would not put child up for adoption was not reasonable in light of fact that birth mother fled from putative father and refused to disclose her location in final months of pregnancy and alleged "unclean hands" by birth mother did not bar prospective adoptive parents from opposing putative father's request for equitable relief.
- Minnesota Statutes §§ 259.49 and 259.52 do not violate due process or equal protection as applied to putative father.
Editor’s note: The Father's Registry, which requires a father to register within 30 days of the birth of a child in order to have notice of adoption proceedings, was upheld by the MN Supreme Court today. The case involved a guy from Iowa, who registered in MN on the 31st day after his child was born. He did not know the mother was in MN until that very day. It was a 4-3 decision. The dissent said that it would be unreasonable for someone to have to register in all 50 states.
Now here's some extra news. If you call the Father's Registry Hotline, 888-345-1726, you get a recording saying that due to a staffing shortage, they can't answer the phone. What's a guy supposed to do if today is the 30th day, and the government hasn't even funded this department with people to promptly accept registrations? The reason they don't fund it, is because they get so few calls. But when someone does need to register right away, the whole bureacracy they've set up, is not there to do its job.
At last report, the father and his attorney were looking into their options of appealing to the US Supreme Court, possibly with R-KIDS’ support.
Court Diminishes Obligor’s Ability to Return to School
In another recent MN Supreme Court case, the syllabus was as follows:
Under Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5b(d) (2000), child support obligor who voluntarily terminates employment and enrolls as a student is "voluntarily unemployed" unless obligor shows that the unemployment "(1) is temporary and will ultimately lead to an increase in income; or (2) represents a bona fide career change that outweighs the adverse effect of that parent's diminished income on the child."
Minnesota Statutes § 518.551, subd. 5b(d), does not limit the power of the courts to consider whether child support obligor's unemployment is in bad faith toward the child support obligation.
Child support magistrate's decision to reduce child support obligor's monthly child support obligation from $400 to $50 was an abuse of discretion when obligor voluntarily terminated his full-time employment to return to school for three and one-half to four years, there was a danger that child's needs would go unmet during this period, and obligor's prediction of post-unemployment increase in income was speculative.
Editor’s note: Justice Page wrote an interesting concurrence, where he stated that this case was fact-specific, i.e. the guy had a bad history of paying support, and did not produce sufficient proof that his future increased income would produce a benefit to the child. The Supreme Court specifically did not overrule a prior Court of Appeals case that went the opposite way. Thus, the lesson to be learned is if you do want child support relief to go to school, you better have been current in your past obligations, and you should have expert testimony from a Vocational Evaluator, that your income after school will go up. If your school of choice is the Seminary, forget it, at least under the way our law is now.
It is still unfortunate that a guy who has dutifully paid his supported his child for fifteen years, would not be allowed to further himself by going to school, because there would be no benefit while the child was still a minor. Yet we don’t have reciprocal laws preventing custodial parents from moving forth with their lives by going to school, because custodial parents are presumed not to be support obligors.
Pro Se Father whose child is kept from him, prevails at MN Supreme Court
{url} http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/archive/supct/0203/c701480.htm
{name} Johnson vs. Murray
{docket #} C7-01-480
{date filed} July 18, 2002
{court} Minn. S Ct.
{decision} Reversed
{reviewed by} MSBA
{categories} UCCJA
{syllabus}
- When evaluating whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over a custody dispute under the default provision of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), the district court erred when it failed to make findings regarding whether another state has jurisdiction and whether the best interest of the child warrants exercising jurisdiction.
- The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a custody dispute under the UCCJA’s default provision when there was evidence showing that no other court had jurisdiction and when it was in the best interest of the child to have a forum to adjudicate custody.
- When applying the unclean hands provision of the UCCJA, the district court abused its discretion in finding that a father engaged in reprehensible conduct when there was no evidence of an abduction or forum-shopping and when the father took physical custody of the child at the request of the maternal grandmother.
- When applying the unclean hands provision of the UCCJA, the district court abused its discretion by engaging only in speculation and failing to make a finding whether exercising jurisdiction would be in the best interest of the child.
- The district court erred when it declined jurisdiction under the unclean hands provision of the UCCJA when the father did not engage in reprehensible conduct and when the best interest of the child warranted that some court exercise jurisdiction.
Appellant commenced an action in Minnesota to determine the paternity and custody of a child. Prior to commencing the action, Johnson obtained physical custody of the child from the maternal grandmother at her request. The district court dismissed Johnson’s action on the grounds that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the child’s mother. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the district court for consideration of a number of issues, including whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the custody dispute under Minnesota’s codification of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA).
On remand, the district court dismissed appellant’s paternity claim on the grounds that the child had not been joined as a party. On the custody claim, the court found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJA because there was insufficient evidence to determine whether another state had jurisdiction and there was not a significant connection between the child’s mother and Minnesota. The court stated that it also could have declined subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJA’s unclean hands provision due to Johnson’s wrongful conduct of taking physical custody of the child. In a second appeal the court of appeals reversed on the issue of paternity and affirmed on the issue of custody. Appellant then appealed the matter of subject matter jurisdiction to the Supreme Court.
The district court made the following findings of fact, some of which were phrased only in terms of what appellant alleged or testified to. In 1988, the parties met each other while employed at Austin Diversified Products. In 1991 respondent gave birth to a child in Oregon. The child’s father was not identified on the birth certificate. During the next four years, the parties and child resided together and moved from state to state selling cleaning products, living in motels, and doing drugs. Appellant testified that the longest period of time they would stay in one place was for about six months each winter when they would stay in California. However, the court also found that appellant stated in an affidavit that to the best of his knowledge, the child had never lived in a state for more than four months.
The parties separated in 1995 and the child remained with the respondent. In1999, the child’s grandmother contacted appellant to request that he come to Michigan to take the child.
The Supreme Court held the district court erred in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over custody claim under the UCCJA stating:
In evaluating whether default jurisdiction exists, a court must determine whether “it appears that no court in another state would have jurisdiction,” whether another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction, and whether it is in the best interest of the child for a Minnesota court to exercise jurisdiction. Minn. Stat. § 518A.03, subd. 1(d). A key indicator of whether it would appear that another state could assert jurisdiction is whether another state would have jurisdiction if an action had been instituted in that state. Peloso v. Botkin, 479 A.2d 156, 158-59 (Vt. 1984). The best interest of the child as used in the default provision “refers to a choice of a forum, not to the fitness of the parents.” State ex rel. Rashid v. Drumm, 824 S.W.2d 497, 503 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). If there is no other forum that can and will adjudicate custody, it is in the best interest of the child that some state have the ability to adjudicate custody matters over the child. Reed v. Reed, 62 S.W.3d 708, 715 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); see In re Marriage of Medill, 40 P.3d 1087, 1092 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). A court commits error if it determines it had no jurisdiction without considering the best interest of the child with respect to a forum. Rashid, 824 S.W.2d at 502.
Here, Johnson was filing his first petition for custody. Under such circumstances, it was reasonable for the district court to have assumed that another state had not declined to exercise jurisdiction. However, the court did not make a finding as to whether it appeared that no other state would have jurisdiction. The court did speculate that California might be able to exercise home state subject matter jurisdiction over the custody dispute, but stated that it could not, “on the evidence before it, conclude that no other State would have jurisdiction.” Moreover, the court did not address whether it was in A.J.’s best interest for a Minnesota court to exercise jurisdiction as it was required to do by statute.
Based on the record before us, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in failing to make findings regarding (1) the availability of another state forum and (2) the best interest of the child. Such findings are mandated by section 518A.03, subd. 1(d). We also conclude that it is in A.J.’s best interest that some forum be available to adjudicate custody because, under the facts here, there is no other forum that can and will adjudicate custody. Further, because the court identified no other state that had jurisdiction and the record does not indicate a substantial presence in any state, we conclude that no other state had jurisdiction. Therefore, we hold that the district court erred when it found that it did not have jurisdiction over the custody dispute under the UCCJA’s default provision.
The Supreme Court also determined the district court abused its discretion in declining jurisdiction because the appellant had unclean hands. The Supreme Court first determined that the district court abused its discretion when it found the appellant had wrongfully gained custody of the child and secondly when it failed to consider whether exercising jurisdiction would be in the child’s best interest. Section 518A.08 requires a court to consider whether declining jurisdiction is just and proper under the circumstances and there is no indication that the court did so here. The Court concluded that it was just and proper under the circumstances that some forum, in this case Minnesota, adjudicate custody.
Court Of Appeals
Published Decisions
Bormann vs. Bormann, C1-01-1947
{date filed} May 21, 2002
{court} Minn. App. published
{decision} Reversed
{reviewed by} MSBA
{categories} Child Support
{summary} Appellant-mother challenged a district court’s order denying
her motion to modify child support. The Court of Appeals reversed because
the district court’s findings were insufficient to support its conclusion
that mother failed to show that the current support order was unreasonable
and unfair.
The parties’ marriage was dissolved in 1992. The parties had one child and at dissolution the district court found that father’s gross annual income was approximately $10,000. The dissolution decree awarded the parties joint physical and legal custody. The parties stipulated that father would pay $440 monthly in child support. In 2001, mother moved for a modification of child support, contending that father’s increased income constituted a significant change in circumstances making the current support order unreasonable and unfair. The parties agreed in affidavits that father’s gross annual income had increased to approximately $175,000. Father agreed to pay guidelines child support, but requested that his annual obligation be offset proportionally for the three months the child resided with him each year.
The district court denied mother’s motion to modify child support. The court did not make a specific finding concerning father’s current net earnings or concerning whether father’s increased income constituted a substantial change in circumstances. The court found that the mother had provided insufficient information about her own earning capacity to allow the court to determine her offsetting support obligation. The court concluded that mother had therefore failed to meet her burden of proof to demonstrate that the original support order was unreasonable and unfair.
Appellant-mother argued that the district court erred in concluding that the mother’s failure to provide sufficient information regarding her finances was adequate grounds for determining that she had failed to prove the original award unreasonable and unfair. The Court of Appeals agreed stating:
Determining whether an existing support obligation is unreasonable and unfair, however, generally involves (but is not necessarily limited to) a comparison of the obligor’s existing obligation with what the obligation would be if it were modified. . . . Thus, while the district court’s inability to calculate mother’s support obligation may be relevant to its determination of the net support payment between the parties, that inability is not dispositive regarding whether father’s existing support obligation is unreasonable and unfair. For this reason, the lack of information regarding mother’s finances is an inadequate basis upon which to conclude that mother failed to prove that father’s support obligation was unreasonable and unfair.
In re: Rutz vs. Rutz, CX-01-2126
{date filed} May 28, 2002
{court} Minn. App. published
{decision} Affirmed
{reviewed by} MSBA
{categories} Parenting Plans; Child Custody
{summary} A designated “method of dispute resolution” is a necessary
component of a “parenting plan” under Minn. Stat. § 518.1705 (2000).
A parent may not move a child’s residence out of Minnesota if the
purpose of the move is to interfere with the parenting time of the other parent.
Three months after entry of judgment dissolving Mark and Irina Rutz’s marriage, Irina Rutz petitioned to move the residence of their two children from Minnesota to Hawaii. The district court, relying in part on statutory provisions governing parenting plans, denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed
The Court of Appeals first decided that the judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage did not create a parenting plan as assumed by the district court. Minnesota Stat. § 518.1705, subd. 2(a)(3) states that a parenting plan must include a method of dispute resolution. Since the judgment did not include such a system, the judgment was not a parenting plan and the standard that applied to removing a child’s residence from Minnesota was found in Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3, not in Minn. Stat. § 518.1705, subd. 7.
In conducting its review, the Court stated:
Removal decisions for custodial arrangements not involving parenting plans are reviewed to determine whether “the trial court abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the law.” Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1996) (quoting Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1985)). Because the court apparently presumed that the parties’ dissolution judgment created a parenting plan, the order does not contain a conventional removal analysis. See id. The district court did, however, find that Irina Rutz’s proposed removal was intended to interfere with Mark Rutz’s parenting time and that this fact compelled denial of Irina Rutz’s motion.
The Court of Appeals rejected appellant’s argument that an intent to interfere is insufficient to deny her motion because the critical issue is whether a new parenting-time arrangement can be ordered that would allow respondent to maintain his relationship with the children.
The Court also rejected appellant’s argument that the record is insufficient to overcome that presumption recognized by Silbaugh and Auge. The Court concluded the presumption was defeated w by a showing that the removal was intended to interfere with visitation.
The Court also rejected appellant’s argument that under Sharp and Dabill a denial of, or interference with, visitation is not controlling in custody-modification proceedings, but must be considered along with other factors, and argues that visitation problems should not preclude removal. These cases did not involve removal and in the removal context, Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3, forbids removal when the intent of the party seeking removal is to interfere with the other parent’s parenting time.
Finally, the Court refused to consider appellant’s argument that the statute violated her right to travel because the issue was not properly before the Court.
In re: Ramsey County o/b/o Rierce County, Wicconsin vs. Carey, C7-01-2052
{date filed} June 25, 2002
{court} Minn. App. published
{decision}Reversed
{reviewed by} MSBA
{categories} Child Support
{syllabus}
- The value of living expenses provided to a disabled father by his parents does not constitute income, earnings, or resources for the purposes of calculating a father’s child support obligation where the father was adjudicated disabled by the Social Security Administration and the expenses provided included room and board in parents’ own home, and miscellaneous items.
- The father demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances rendering his current support obligation unreasonable and unfair, and warranting a modification of his child support obligation, where the decrease in his income resulted in a guidelines support obligation that is at least 20% and $50 less than the current support order, and where there is no rebuttal of the resulting statutory presumption under Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2(b)(1) (Supp. 2001), that the current obligation is unreasonable and unfair.
- An income below the federal poverty line renders payment of child-care costs presumptively unreasonable.
Appellant was paying child support of $300 per month when he was adjudicated totally disabled by the Social Security Administration and began receiving disability benefits. Appellant moved to modify his child support obligation. Prior to the hearing, appellant indicated on the court’s information request form that his expenses were being paid by a supplemental needs trust established by his parents for his benefit. Appellant’s mother, who has power of attorney for appellant, represented that appellant’s monthly expenses were at least $3,000.
The magistrate found that appellant had an imputed monthly income of $3,000 from the trust and $611 in disability benefits. The magistrate granted appellant an adjustment, reducing his payments to reflect the amount of dependent benefits paid to the minor child from social security.
Later, appellant again moved to modify his child support obligation. At the hearing on that motion, appellant mother testified that appellant’s monthly expenses had decreased significantly because appellant was no longer able to live independently and had moved into his parents’ home. The only funds deposited into the trust since 2001, were appellant’s disability benefits. Appellant’s expenses averaged $667 per month and his disability payments were $633. Appellant’s mother testified that the monthly expenses for the family’s household were at least $2,700.
The magistrate imputed $900 per month of in-kind income to appellant which was one-third of the household’s monthly expenses. Subtracting out-of-pocket medical expenses of $411.79 from the imputed income and disability payments, the magistrate determined that appellant’s average net monthly income was at least $1,121.21, that guideline support would be at least $280.30, and that appellant had failed to establish a substantial change in circumstances rendering the current support order unreasonable and unfair.
Appellant argued that the parent’s contribution to his living expenses should not be imputed to him as income. The Court of Appeals agreed stating:
On this record, the payments made by Carey’s parents for Carey’s expenses are not made to Carey. Therefore, those payments cannot be his “income” under the statutory definition of that term. Neither can we conclude that what is provided for Carey by his parents constitutes either his “earnings” or his “resources.” There is no evidence in the record that Carey has, in any way, “earned” any sums from his parents. Similarly, because there is no indication that Carey has any control over, or input regarding, the use of any of the funds expended by his parents for his expenses, we cannot say that what his parents provide for him can be deemed his “resource.” Thus, he has no income other than his $633 per month in social security disability benefits, he has no earnings, and he has no resources upon which a child support obligation may be imposed.
The Court reviewed the several statutory mechanisms that exist to address any atypical ability a child support obligor may have to satisfy a support obligation but concluded none applied to this situation. The court distinguished Barnier that held that gifts “regularly received from a dependable source,” may properly be included in the obligor’s income for support purposes. Unlike the situation in Barnier, this case contained no reference to any payments, “periodic” or otherwise, being made to appellant himself by his parents. Moreover, appellant had no control over the expenditure of funds on his behalf.
The Court concluded that:
Any “income” imputed to Carey by the magistrate has as its sole source the care and kindness of parents providing to an adult, disabled child those necessities that the child is unable to provide for himself. To label as “income” that which Carey’s parents are providing to him is tantamount to placing upon those parents the obligation to support their grandchild. While Carey’s parents may wish to be generous in their voluntary care and concern for their grandchild, they cannot be legally required to provide monetary support for the grandchild through the guise of imputing as “income” to Carey the value of the services and necessities provided to him by his parents.
Editor’s note: This Child Support Magistrate (her name is Ann Leppanen, as I recall) would have really opened a new avenue to unfairly nail people for child support. The Court of Appeals was right to reverse this absurd decision. Ann Leppanen is a former Legal Services Staff Attorney. Being a Child Support Magistrate is a “Pink-Collar” profession, which tends to attract people with an axe to grind against men. I have had a prior bad experience with this CSM against Ann Leppanen. If you are a male obligor, and find her sitting on the bench in your case, you may wish to explore your rights to remove her as your magistrate.
Johnson vs. Murray, C7-01-480
{date filed} July 18, 2002
{court} Minn. S Ct.
{decision} Reversed
{reviewed by} MSBA
{categories} UCCJA
{syllabus}
- When evaluating whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over a custody dispute under the default provision of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), the district court erred when it failed to make findings regarding whether another state has jurisdiction and whether the best interest of the child warrants exercising jurisdiction.
- The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a custody dispute under the UCCJA’s default provision when there was evidence showing that no other court had jurisdiction and when it was in the best interest of the child to have a forum to adjudicate custody.
- When applying the unclean hands provision of the UCCJA, the district court abused its discretion in finding that a father engaged in reprehensible conduct when there was no evidence of an abduction or forum-shopping and when the father took physical custody of the child at the request of the maternal grandmother.
- When applying the unclean hands provision of the UCCJA, the district court abused its discretion by engaging only in speculation and failing to make a finding whether exercising jurisdiction would be in the best interest of the child.
- The district court erred when it declined jurisdiction under the unclean hands provision of the UCCJA when the father did not engage in reprehensible conduct and when the best interest of the child warranted that some court exercise jurisdiction.
Appellant commenced an action in Minnesota to determine the paternity and custody of a child. Prior to commencing the action, Johnson obtained physical custody of the child from the maternal grandmother at her request. The district court dismissed Johnson’s action on the grounds that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the child’s mother. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the district court for consideration of a number of issues, including whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the custody dispute under Minnesota’s codification of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA).
On remand, the district court dismissed appellant’s paternity claim on the grounds that the child had not been joined as a party. On the custody claim, the court found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJA because there was insufficient evidence to determine whether another state had jurisdiction and there was not a significant connection between the child’s mother and Minnesota. The court stated that it also could have declined subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJA’s unclean hands provision due to Johnson’s wrongful conduct of taking physical custody of the child. In a second appeal the court of appeals reversed on the issue of paternity and affirmed on the issue of custody. Appellant then appealed the matter of subject matter jurisdiction to the Supreme Court.
The district court made the following findings of fact, some of which were phrased only in terms of what appellant alleged or testified to. In 1988, the parties met each other while employed at Austin Diversified Products. In 1991 respondent gave birth to a child in Oregon. The child’s father was not identified on the birth certificate. During the next four years, the parties and child resided together and moved from state to state selling cleaning products, living in motels, and doing drugs. Appellant testified that the longest period of time they would stay in one place was for about six months each winter when they would stay in California. However, the court also found that appellant stated in an affidavit that to the best of his knowledge, the child had never lived in a state for more than four months.
The parties separated in 1995 and the child remained with the respondent. In1999, the child’s grandmother contacted appellant to request that he come to Michigan to take the child.
The Supreme Court held the district court erred in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over custody claim under the UCCJA stating:
In evaluating whether default jurisdiction exists, a court must determine whether “it appears that no court in another state would have jurisdiction,” whether another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction, and whether it is in the best interest of the child for a Minnesota court to exercise jurisdiction. Minn. Stat. § 518A.03, subd. 1(d). A key indicator of whether it would appear that another state could assert jurisdiction is whether another state would have jurisdiction if an action had been instituted in that state. Peloso v. Botkin, 479 A.2d 156, 158-59 (Vt. 1984). The best interest of the child as used in the default provision “refers to a choice of a forum, not to the fitness of the parents.” State ex rel. Rashid v. Drumm, 824 S.W.2d 497, 503 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). If there is no other forum that can and will adjudicate custody, it is in the best interest of the child that some state have the ability to adjudicate custody matters over the child. Reed v. Reed, 62 S.W.3d 708, 715 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); see In re Marriage of Medill, 40 P.3d 1087, 1092 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). A court commits error if it determines it had no jurisdiction without considering the best interest of the child with respect to a forum. Rashid, 824 S.W.2d at 502.
Here, Johnson was filing his first petition for custody. Under such circumstances, it was reasonable for the district court to have assumed that another state had not declined to exercise jurisdiction. However, the court did not make a finding as to whether it appeared that no other state would have jurisdiction. The court did speculate that California might be able to exercise home state subject matter jurisdiction over the custody dispute, but stated that it could not, “on the evidence before it, conclude that no other State would have jurisdiction.” Moreover, the court did not address whether it was in A.J.’s best interest for a Minnesota court to exercise jurisdiction as it was required to do by statute.
Based on the record before us, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in failing to make findings regarding (1) the availability of another state forum and (2) the best interest of the child. Such findings are mandated by section 518A.03, subd. 1(d). We also conclude that it is in A.J.’s best interest that some forum be available to adjudicate custody because, under the facts here, there is no other forum that can and will adjudicate custody. Further, because the court identified no other state that had jurisdiction and the record does not indicate a substantial presence in any state, we conclude that no other state had jurisdiction. Therefore, we hold that the district court erred when it found that it did not have jurisdiction over the custody dispute under the UCCJA’s default provision.
The Supreme Court also determined the district court abused its discretion in declining jurisdiction because the appellant had unclean hands. The Supreme Court first determined that the district court abused its discretion when it found the appellant had wrongfully gained custody of the child and secondly when it failed to consider whether exercising jurisdiction would be in the child’s best interest. Section 518A.08 requires a court to consider whether declining jurisdiction is just and proper under the circumstances and there is no indication that the court did so here. The Court concluded that it was just and proper under the circumstances that some forum, in this case Minnesota, adjudicate custody.
MORE INFO ON WORK PERMITS FOR PARENTING TIME TRANSPORATION
To follow up on the article in the last newsletter, about work permits for people who lost their driving privileges due to nonpayment of support, we received the following email. If you get a work permit, and are stopped while transporting your kids, you might want to carry a copy of this.
I checked with Rep. Boudreau and other sources and they have confirmed that limited licenses would indeed be valid for maintaining visitation/parenting time agreements and the dept knows this is the legislative intent.
----- Original Message ----- From: "David Anderson" <David.Anderson@house.leg.state.mn.us> To: <Tim Theisen> Sent: Monday, April 29, 2002 1:31 PM Subject: Re: Fw: Limited License Provision
David A.P. Anderson Legislative Assistant Minnesota House of Representatives David.Anderson@house.leg.state.mn.us
Hennepin County Self-Help Center
Hennepin County has a good program for people who want to try to do their family court cases without an attorney. For more information, go to this website: http://www.co.hennepin.mn.us/courts/SelfHelp/shmain.htm
One of my goals in the next year, is to look into how counties are helping, or can do more to help, men who get served child support papers, but simply want joint legal custody or a parenting time schedule. The current system makes it very easy for the mom to get support, but rather cumbersome for the dad to get parenting time, or tax exemptions, or joint legal custody, or a court services custody study. I get a lot of people in my practice, who complied with the county’s request for child support without a complaint, but they come to see me after their ex cuts off or interferes with parenting time.
Tim Theisen, Esq. R-KIDS newsletter editor
Hennepin County Judicial Evaluation Website
The Hennepin County Bar Association is launching a three-year experiment with a new judicial-evaluation process, in which more information, and more relevant and useful information, will be available to the practicing bar and to the public. The Bar Association's leadership--whose Governing Council unanimously approved the new process in February, after a six-month study--hopes that this new process will dramatically better serve the essential purposes of judicial evaluation:
informing the public about how well the community's judges are exercising their offices and upholding their public trust, and returning honest feedback to judges that will help them function as effectively as possible.
I am writing in order to announce the launch of the new process's most visible feature: a website that allows "one-stop shopping" for information about each judge. This website will collect and publish hard factual data about judges' performance, including but not limited to--
- how promptly the judge disposes of pending cases;
- how often the judge disposes of cases by summary judgment, alternative dispute resolution, and other methods short of trial;
- how often the judge gets removed from cases;
- how often the judge's decisions are appealed from, and how often such appeals result in those decisions being affirmed or reversed; and
- how often the judge attends or is absent from his or her judicial duties.
This information has hitherto been unavailable in any meaningfully accessible form to the practicing bar, let alone the public. Furthermore, the old process surveyed lawyers about each judge only every sixth year, so that the information about a given judge might be years old. The new process will publish current information about every judge, updated regularly, so that the best available information about every judge will be as up-to-date as possible.
To access "one-stop shopping" for a judge, please visit the Association's website at www.hcba.org. There you will find a wealth of information about your judge, much of it previously unavailable, and never before accessible through a single source:
- biographical information about the judge, including the profile from The Hennepin Lawyer when the judge was first elevated to the bench;
- objective statistics about the judge's performance, with links to statistics for the whole bench for purposes of comparison;
- the judge's performance in past elections, plebiscites, and judicial evaluations;
- practical information, furnished by the judge himself or herself based on standard questions, about how the judge manages cases and about procedure in his or her courtroom;
- links to basic information about the Court's organization and schedule, and the individual judge's experience within that structure.
If the judge is being challenged for reelection, then the website will also publish information about the challenger.
We are still awaiting information from some judges, and some links are still under construction, so please bear with us as we finish bringing the new process online. But the website as it stands will give you a good idea of what it will look like when it is complete. We hope that the new judicial-evaluation process, especially this new online resource, will bring a wealth of new and useful information into the public eye.
BRM Brian Melendez, President, Hennepin County Bar Association
UNITED WAY FOR R-KIDS
Last year, only four people in the Greater Twin Cities area designated their United Way contributions to R-Kids under the Donor Choice/Specific Care program. We received over $600.00 from just those four contributors. Since we have approximately 100 members in this area, we suspect that several thousand dollars more could have been received. We are disappointed that more people did not take advantage of this chance to help children. Lets all try to do better this year. On the United Way Form, check the Box for “Specific Agency” and fill in R-Kids name. Else don’t give to United Way at all.
Request that your friends and co-workers also designate their contribution to R-Kids. Either one-time contributions or payroll deductions can be designated for R-Kids. Otherwise your United Way contribution will go to organizations that prevent visitation, want higher child support payments and want less father involvement. Those organizations want more children with problems so they can get more money to provide programs for these children whose social ills they have worked to create.
Thank you all for your support. Especially we wish to thank those three people who made contributions to R-Kids through the Donor Choice/Specific Care program last year.
Knute Gladen, President R-Kids of Minnesota
R-KIDS FESTIVAL AND PICNIC
On June 15, 2002, approximately 50 people attended the R-Kids festival and picnic at Central Park in Roseville. Lunch consisted of hot dogs, snacks, cake and good fellowship. It was nice to see and talk with so many of the people who support our efforts.
Dawn Snyder-Volk chaired the event. Dawn and Mick Fry introduced the speakers. Terri Dullnig catered lunch that fed the hungry multitudes. Merritt and Jean Cody set up two kiddy-carnival rides for the event, which entertained and excited the children.
R-KIDS BILL COMMITTEE
During the past year, you all went to considerable expense and effort to prepare a child support guidelines bill. It was introduced as SF3351 and HF3582. It is a good bill, very fair to both custodial and non-custodial parents and will promote involvement of both parents in the lives of their children. We need to make a mighty push to get the bill introduced again and made into law.
For that reason, R-Kids is forming a “one trick pony” committee. The focus of the Bill Committee will be to get the bill made into law, nothing else. We think that the biggest evil is that support payments impoverish non-custodial parents to the point that they are incapacitated and children suffer. The purpose of the committee will be to plan and implement strategy. We will keep you informed. Else call the R-Kids phone number and ask what is going on.
VIDEO PROGRAMS
R-Kids has made eight video programs, each one-hour long. More are planned. We expect to have copies for sale and distribution shortly. These one-hour programs are being shown on Twin City cable TV networks. They are very controversial and are raising awareness of the problems that R-Kids is trying to solve. The last video was made on June 21 with Author Warren Farrell - what a charmer! His latest book is Father and Child Reunion. Copies of his easy-to-read books can be ordered at B. Dalton and other bookstores. Warren Farrell is well on his way to becoming the greatest social reformer of the 21st century.
R-KIDS BILL COMMITTEE
Notes of meeting, July 15, 2002, Perkins Café, 3855 North Lexington Ave, Arden Hills
Attending: Hoppe, Huyck, Starr, Wenck, Schwecke, Brethorst, Nyblom, Jabr, Barrett, Aldrich, Gladen
- Dennis Schwecke and Kevin Hoppe have agreed to co-chair the Bill Committee. The next meeting will be in two weeks on Monday, July 29, 2002. Notices will be sent.
- Bills go through several legislative committees - there is some experience within our group about which legislators to contact. Since legislative committees will not be assigned until in December, we will communicate with everyone who is running. A list of candidates is available from the Secretary of State website.
- Jamil Jabr volunteered draft a letter for review. He hoped to have it in a week.
- Bob Wenck is going to make copies of the bill and justification charts that can be distributed at the capitol to save postage. Bob Wenck will compose a cover letter.
- The DHS has listed a cost of $700,000 to train judges and others if any new child support legislation is passed. There is a need to convince the finance committees that there will be a saving if our bill becomes law.
- Everyone should try to talk to their legislator and ask them to read and understand our bill. Right now is a good time to try to set up a meeting. After State Fair time, they will be busy trying to get elected. After the election they are quite busy also.
- Our bill will Help Children, Help Parents and Help Society.
- Several possibilities for hiring a lobbyist were discussed.
- We expect to bring in R. Mark Rogers and perhaps Jack Graham to testify during the legislative session.
Submitted by
Knute Gladen R-Kids of Minnesota
Friend of RKIDS Runs for Office
Dear R-Kids member,
For the last 12 years, I have been a lobbyist for Family Law issues. I have been very active with the R-Kids organization. I have been on several Task Forces representing you and your interests. I have helped draft and pass many laws and amendments relating to Family Law. I know many of the legislators at the Capitol. I understand the legislative process and have proven that I can get things done.
My husband is a non-custodial parent and we got involved because of denied visitation issues. I really care about what has happened to you and it breaks my heart how the system takes children away from their fathers. I really want to make changes to our current divorce system.
I have decided to run for Dakota County Commissioner. This will be a good position for me and I will be able to help people with some of their problems. I need to win the Primary election in September and the general election in November.
I could use your help in two ways. I need financial help. I need to raise $20,000. The contribution does not apply to the state rebate program. I would greatly appreciate any amount you could give to my campaign. I have a lot of expenses right now to pay for brochures, signs, stickers, mailings, and other expenses. It would be great if you could send me the donation in the next few weeks. If not, please send it when you can. You can make the check out to: Committee to Elect Diane Anderson and mail it to 4295 Eagle Crest Drive, Eagan, MN 55122.
Secondly, I need volunteers. There are many ways you can help me. I am going to be in the 4th of July parade in Eagan. The line up for the parade starts at 9:30am and the parade starts at 10:00am. I am number 43 in the parade. The parade route is very short and you should be done by 11:15am. Please come and walk with me. The more people the better. Call me at 651-688-9461 or e-mail me at gma@pro-ns.net and I will get you the details of where the parade starts.
I also need volunteers to hand out literature, make phone calls, put up lawn signs, and write letters to the editor. Please let me know if you are willing to help with any of these activities. I would really appreciate your help. Please e-mail me or call me if you are willing to help with my campaign.
Your help will make this campaign successful.
Diane Anderson 651-688-9461 4295 Eagle Crest Drive Eagan, MN 55122
Open Child Protection Hearings
Chief Justice Blatz:
(others as blind carbon copies - you may wish to give your comments to Chief Justice Blatz also)
Thank you for opening up the Child Abuse hearings. Children in abused situations certainly do not care about the public knowing, they only wish the abuse would stop. Closed hearings only protected the guilty adults, especially those government employees who are supposed to be experts.
Open hearings tend to force judges and child protection officials to be better prepared for the hearings, according to reports on your pilot program of open abuse hearings. Children were not reported to have been concerned with the publicity.
Why are all of these cases reports of abuse by mothers? Why are none of these reported cases abuse by fathers? We know that the ratio of child homicides is 78 percent mothers and mothers friends to very few fathers. We are looking for a ratio of abuse, mothers and mothers friends to fathers, knowing that the press, the Minnesota Department of Human Services, Minnesota Judges, Minnesota Guardian ad litems, Minnesota County Social Service workers and the general public thinks that children are only abused by fathers. We wish to stop child abuse. Father custody, rather than mother custody, may be the answer.
Again, please accept R-Kids thanks for opening abuse court hearings.
Knute Gladen, President R-Kids of Minnesota
RAMSEY COUNTY: Child protection system opens
Posted on Wed, Jul. 03, 2002
BY HANNAH ALLAM, Pioneer Press
One mother recently delivered her third cocaine-addicted baby. Another mom couldn't explain the adult human bite marks on her two young children. The parents of lice-infested children with bedsores and too many school absences sat silent.
These mothers and fathers were in Ramsey County District Court on Tuesday in hopes of winning back their children, most of whom are living with foster families or relatives. It was a routine court day, except that these previously confidential cases were available to the public for the first time since the Minnesota Supreme Court decided in December to open child-protection hearings across the state.
The change comes at a time when the caseload is increasing at an alarming rate, said Tama Hall, administrator for Ramsey County special courts. The number of neglect and abuse cases has more than doubled in the past five years, and more parents than ever are losing their children. Last year, 751 new children entered the system in the county. Hearings are now on Tuesdays and Thursdays, and an extra judge was recently assigned to child-protection hearings.
"In order for us to keep up, we're going to have to change how we dedicate resources," Hall said.
Few details about the abuse and neglect are hashed out in courtrooms, which are on the fourth floor of a spacious building at Seventh and St. Peter streets across from the Minnesota Children's Museum in St. Paul. But the new rule allows the public to read the progress reports of child-protection agents, social workers and attorneys. Often the stories are grim, court workers said, but there are also success stories.
"I've seen people change — miracles," said Bob Lawton, a public defender who handled 10 of Tuesday's cases. "There are people whose rights are practically terminated and, a year later, they're raising their kids."
Last April, a barefoot boy and girl darted between cars in a store parking lot while their methamphetamine-addicted mother lay unconscious in the family car. Police shook the woman awake and the children were removed from her custody.
On Tuesday, attorneys winced as the mom flounced into court wearing an off-the-shoulder denim-and-lace outfit and lots of makeup. But Ramsey County District Judge Teresa Warner, who had seen the woman look much worse after drug binges, said her appearance had actually improved.
With a soft "Yes," the woman admitted to endangering her children with her behavior and agreed to treatment and parenting classes. The children would remain in foster care.
"She's progressing," Warner said of the mother. "The picture that was painted for me when she first came to court on this case and how she is now shows a lot of improvement. You can't help but be happy for her and encourage her. Before she can parent her kid, she's got to take care of herself."
Police or child-protection authorities investigate reports of abuse or neglect and, if substantiated, determine whether to remove a child from the home. Once a child is placed in protective custody, the case triggers a series of court hearings in which parents admit or deny the allegations. Denial of the allegations usually leads to a trial in which the case is either dismissed, or the parent is found to be unfit.
Parents who admit they need help embark on a plan — often involving counseling, addiction treatment and other services — and return to court every three months for reviews. Unlike adult court, the case wends its way through the system under the watch of several extra players — prosecutors, defense attorneys, social workers and child guardians.
Judges and attorneys don't expect crowds of onlookers at the hearings, but they anticipate more family friends and supporters. Opponents of open hearings feared media sensationalism and children's loss of privacy, while supporters hoped for more public scrutiny of the cases.
Lawton is a critic of the decision, which he thinks will cause families unnecessary pain and humiliation.
"I don't think people's dirty laundry should be public," he said. "I don't know what good comes from knowing a lot of dysfunctional things about families."
Suggested Changes to Federal Welfare Law
Dear Members and Friends:
Minnesota US. Congressmen have indicated they hadn't received our request for an Amendment to Federal Welfare Law. Email and faxes appear to be the only way to achieve contact with the feds? The US. House of Representative has passed their version of the welfare bill. Now the US Senate is getting started on their version and is slated for completion by July 30/02.
This is perfect timing and an opportunity to lobby Minnesota Senator Wellstone and Senator Dayton to offer an amendment to the US Senate version. The goal still is to have States Child Support reviews conducted by independent economists.
"PLEASE" Take the time to help in this effort by contacting your US. Senators, and ask for their support. Also request a response from them as well. "Senator Wellstone's aide can be reached at" bass_zanjani@wellstone.senate.gov "Senator Dayton's aide can be reached at" katherine_monge@dayton.senate.gov
"Title your email "REAUTHORIZATION OF TANF"
R-KIDS of Minnesota is joining in a national lobbing effort to change how states conduct their year review of Child Support Guidelines.
If we are successful this could help correct many injustices. "Please" forward this Email to friend's,
The Bush administration has decided that the solution to child poverty is marriage. Unfortunately, while policy makers promote marriage for the poor, federal child support policy continues to tear apart middle-income families. Non-custodial parents now have a brief opportunity to impact welfare law that will promote parental involvement and give credit where credit is do.
The federal government rewards states that collect the most child support with millions in "incentive payments." States have turned child support enforcement into a profit center by inflating child support awards from middle-income parents, there-by maximizing these federal incentive payments. According to the House Committee on Ways and Means 2000 Green Book, in 1998 the federal government lost 1.4 billion dollars from child support enforcement activities, while the states earned 340 million dollars.
As a condition for receiving federal incentive payments, welfare law requires each state to calculate child support in both welfare and non-welfare cases using a numerical guideline. Current state child support guidelines were actually designed only for welfare cases, and do not take into account the costs of raising children at higher income levels. As a result they yield inappropriately high awards in non-welfare cases, far exceeding the costs of raising children in the custodial household.
The federal government bribes states to collect child support, and then allows states unlimited leeway to set their own child support levels. Is it any surprise that your state's guideline probably transfers 25% to 57.5% of your income to your ex-wife as "child support"?
As parents, we must explain to lawmakers that excessive child support awards harm children and fathers because they discourage shared parenting. A divorcing parent is counseled by her attorney to minimize the father's parenting time in order to maximize her share of his future income. One parent is then left with insufficient access to the children, and insufficient remaining income to maintain an adequate second home for them. State lawmakers routinely kill shared parenting legislation because child support collections would be reduced.
Legislators must also be made to realize that in violation of welfare law, state child support guidelines are not being effectively reviewed to ensure that they result in economically appropriate awards. State and Office of Child Support Enforcement-directly profit from high child support awards. Current welfare law fails to ban these glaring conflicts of interest, ensuring that state guidelines are never effectively reviewed and revised.
Excessive child support awards encourage divorce, subsidize single headed households, and marginalize fathers from the lives of their children. These effects are directly counter to the Bush administration's goal of marriage promotion.
To protect children, and federal taxpayers from these continuing abuses, every person reading this should call, write or fax their Congressman and request the following changes in welfare law (Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 667(a)):
Sec. 667. - State guidelines for child support awards (CURRENT LANGUAGE) (a) Establishment of guidelines; method
Each State, as a condition for having its State plan approved under this part, must establish guidelines for child support award amounts within the State. The guidelines may be established by law or by judicial or administrative action, and shall be reviewed at least once every 4 years to ensure that their application results in the determination of appropriate child support award amounts.
Sec. 667. - State guidelines for child support awards (PROPOSED LANGUAGE) (a) Establishment of guidelines; method
Each State, as a condition for having its State plan approved under this part, must establish guidelines for child support award amounts within the State. The guidelines must be established by law, and shall be reviewed at least once every 4 years by a neutral economic consultant with no political or financial interest in child support guidelines, enforcement, or collection to ensure that their application results in the determination of appropriate child support award amounts. An appropriate child support award amount is defined as one which allocates the basic, reasonable, marginal expenses of children in the custodial household equitably between the custodial and noncustodial parents.
Personal note, We do not feel the needless intrusion of government into the lives of law abiding citizens is warranted, but nevertheless We can't afford to stop it either.
As always Thank you for helping out wear you can,
Terry Nyblom R-KIDS of Minnesota
Dayton, Mark (D - MN) 346 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510 (202) 224-3244 http://dayton.senate.gov/webform.html
Wellstone, Paul (D - MN) 136 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON DC 20510 (202) 224-5641 http://www.senate.gov/~wellstone/webform.html
If you want more info on federal welfare issue/law click here.
Click here: TITLE 42 , CHAPTER 7 , SUBCHAPTER IV , Part D , Sec. 667.
Additional insight can also be found at these web addresses. Men's News Daily April 18, 2002 "Fathers, Marriage, and Welfare Policy" by Richard M. Green, MD http://www.mensnewsdaily.com/stories/green041802.htm
Another excellent commentary by Dr. Green: "Limit Federal Child Support Enforcement to Welfare Cases" http://www.rightturns.com/forum/green/rgcurrent.htm
Guardian ad litem issues
Please download, read and print this 4 page summary of the 94 page report on Guardian At Litem (GAL) issues. Request a copy of the report. I don't know if copies are still available, but also ask if it is available on the internet. The recommendations in the summary are quite good.
You may wish to e-mail Mark Toogood, GAL Program Manager, Supreme Court of Minnesota at mark.toogood@courts.state.mn.us. Encourage him to implement the recommendations of the report. He can use your letter to provide support for those changes. Mark Toogood can NOT solve your individual problem, but is very interested in PATTERNS of activities that have caused hardship to children. His mission is to try to resolve the GAL issues identified in the report, to make the program more consistent throughout Minnesota, and to provide a mechanism to promote continuing and proper training. Judges as well as Guardians Ad Litem need training, it seems.
Mark Toogood has requested support if they recommend legislation. Specifically, the program may request may request funding at the Supreme Court Level (State vs County level) in order to provide consistency. He has asked for our support on this matter. R-Kids is willing to step forward to help, provided that the recommendations promote the involvement of both parents in the lives of children. As evidenced by children’s health studies, having fathers involved cuts child illness by half - social problems, asthma, hyperactive attention deficit disorder, feelings of terror, suicide, crime, teen pregnancy, etc, etc. That is an area that needs to be included in training for Guardians ad Litem. (Read Warren Farrell's book Father and Child Reunion.)
Thank you all for your support of R-Kids continuing efforts.
Knute Gladen R-Kids of Minnesota From: "Wenck, Bob" <bob.wenck@lmco.com> The link:
http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/1995/guardsum.htm
The Summary:
More Information
The Program Evaluation Division was directed to conduct this study by the Legislative Audit Commission on July 21, 1995. For a copy of the full report, entitled "Guardians Ad Litem," (95-03), 94 pp., published on February 27, 1995, please call 651/296-4708, e-mail Legislative.Auditor@state.mn.us, or write to Office of the Legislative Auditor, 658 Cedar St., St. Paul, MN 55155.
Staff who worked on this project were Jan Sandberg (project manager) and Susan Von Mosch, with help from Kathleen Vanderwall, Carrie Meyerhoff, Connie Reimer (intern), and Matthew Bower (intern). For more information, contact Jan Sandberg.
Letter to the editor re: gender bias
Dear Tim,
I have been, as you put it through the ringer with false accusations of abuse, the OFP and then the divorce. I have never seen or experienced a more gender bias and prejudice system in my life. It is ludicrous and preposterous what the system is doing to men. Then enters the political child abuse by the system and its incompetent and negligent wards. It seems like a hopeless fight and it appears the one way to open the eyes of the system to this blatant injustice is through a class action law suit against the state of Minnesota. There is power in numbers and men are going to have to put their male pride aside and fight for their rights as parents. The feminist movement has already taken over the courts and it is a form of communism with the approach they have taken.
All men need to fight this injustice or be considered guilty until proven innocent with the mindset of the system currently in place! If you are a man in family court your children have no civil rights or constitutional rights and as a man your civil and constitutional rights do not exist. Do be naive and believe other wise or you are doomed! If there is going to be a class action law suit it has to happen now! I have posted charges against the ninth district court and the state on www.bigclassaction.com and hope others will follow suite.
Respectfully yours,
Brian Affeldt baffeldt@tds.net
Another Letter to the editor
Tim - I found your website through R-KIDS of Minnesota.
I'm glad to see an attorney understands our problem with child support in Minnesota. However, understanding it and doing something about it are two very different things. We fathers AND mothers that are noncustodial parents need legal help which I have found very difficult to find. No one seems to have the courage to stand up for what's right and fair. It's there, in black and white, how discriminatory Minnesota law is to these people working their butts off to pay child support and just survive on their own terms. None of us want to file for bankruptcy, we try to do anything to avoid it, yet many are forced to, and child support is still there. A black cloud you can never get rid of.
I'm trying to buy a house. The mortgage lenders tell me, your credit is great, but what about this thing with Minnesota child support. Can't give you a loan unless that is taken care of. But you can be on welfare and get a mortgage. Tell me, where is the fairness there?
D.L.
MNBWA Fund Raising Circular
From: "Jack Graham", July 02, 2002
The Minnesota Battered Women's Act was adopted in 1977. Legislative debates reveal that the opposition in both the House and the Senate attempted to amend the law to make benefits available to both men and women. The majority hooted that the problem of battered men does not exist, that women are always the victims of domestic violence, and that men are always the culprits. One of the opposition speakers later became governor of the State, and, while in that office, his ex-wife openly admitted that she had assaulted him with a knife several times during their marriage. The bill passed by overwhelming majorities, and has been liberally expanded and funded ever since.
The battered women's centers established under the Act serve primarily to generate hate propaganda against men, to secure court orders, often based on gross perjury, throwing men out of their homes and taking their children without notice and hearing, to create a prejudicial atmosphere in family courts, and to lobby the legislature for increasingly oppressive laws against men year after year. About $30 million dollars in public money is currently spent under the Act every year. Not one penny is spent on research into the causes and nature of domestic violence, since the objective of the Act is not to reduce domestic violence, but to use domestic violence as a pretext to oppress men in the judicial system of Minnesota.
It is now established by a vast body of professional literature that domestic violence is a problem shared by men and women, and that women initiate and carry out physical assaults against their partners as often as men. The discovery of this reality was pioneered by university women with doctorates. An excellent bibliography, prepared by Dr. Martin Fiebert at California State University at Long Beach, can be accessed at www.csulb.edu/~mfiebert/assault.htm.
Under decisions of the United States Supreme Court, legislation sweepingly discriminating against men or women is subject to a strong presumption that it is not constitutional. Even if men were the worst offenders in domestic violence, which is not so, that would not be enough to save the Minnesota Battered Women's Act.
R-KIDS of Minnesota, the Men’s Rights Association, and the Twin Cities and Greater New York Chapters of the National Coalition of Free Men are sponsoring litigation to strike down the Minnesota Battered Women's Act as unconstitutional. Our objective is to strike down the Act, and cut of the funding of the feminist power structure in the State, with beneficial ripple effects across the country.
The case is entitled Booth et al. v. Hvass et al., No. 01-3510 on the docket of the United Statutes Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit. Our main submissions can be accessed at
www.r-kids.org/BWA_Documents . Our progress has been very good, but we need funds to continue anticipated future stages of this litigation.
Contributions may be made to the R-KIDS Charitable Fund, EIN No. 36-360419, which qualifies for tax deductions under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Make checks payable to R-Kids MNBWA. Mail to R-KIDS, P.O. Box 24658, Mpls, MN 55424. Thank you for your support.
Constitutional right to equal placement debated in Wisconsin
R-Kids Members and Associates (blind carbon copies)
Here is a constitutional issue dealing with parenting time.
This Wisconsin lawsuit has application in Minnesota. The same constitutional rules apply. The same types of misconduct are being performed by government officials. It is recommended that interested parties print out the brief and study it.
The constitutional issues must be raised in each case, when the case is first filed. Else the ability to use that argument is lost when one goes up on appeal. These issues will be decided only by appealing the decisions of the lower court.
Knute Gladen
R-Kids of Minnesota
Wisconsin Court of Appeals to decide soon if equal placement is a fundamental right
Most members of Wisconsin Fathers for Children and Families want Wisconsin family courts to equally support their parental responsibilities and rights. Instead, court orders or coerced stipulations deprive many members of equal placement with their own children.
While most legal professionals think the present system works just fine, they cannot see, and/or don’t care about, the emotional and financial damage the existing legal process creates for many families. Many don’t seem to care about the impact of their decisions. After all, it does not involve their children or money and they don’t have to live with the consequences of their decisions.
Some fathers, like WFCF member Robert Moore, have argued in court that, fit parents have fundamental civil and constitutional rights and responsibilities to parent their own children equal to the rights enjoyed by the children's other parent. So when a therapist, GAL, or court counselor recommends that the children live predominantly with one parent, or a court orders an involuntary unequal placement, when both parents are fit, this is unconstitutional. The judge in Moore's case dismissed the brief, which was written by a prominent Madison civil rights attorney, as frivolous, without explanation.
Most family law attorneys refuse to take this approach. In most counties, family law professionals are a very close knit group. It is a lucrative business for many of these professionals and no one wants to rock the boat that keeps their businesses thriving.
Trial judges, who are often also a part of this close knit group, usually ignore or dismiss this request as being frivolous when it is raised before them, as in Moore's case. In cases where this issue was raised on appeal, it has been brushed aside, ignored or not addressed, often because it was not properly raised at the trial court level.
The issue of whether equal placement is a fundamental and statutory right is currently before the District I Court of Appeals. It was extensively briefed, and fully raised at the trial court level in the case of Jan Raz v Mary A.Brown. A decision on this issue is expected this summer.
The brief submitted by Jan Raz, currently also the president of WFCF, argues that in placement disputes between two fit parents, "each parent has a fundamental right to assume equal periods of placement of the children, unless there is credible evidence that a parent is not fit, that this placement would be harmful to the children, or that circumstances of the parties do not allow this. This right is fundamental, not one that parents must win as a result of a lengthy, intrusive and costly legal battle, or to compromise in order to reach a stipulated agreement to avoid such a battle."
The brief cites the due process and equal protection provisions of the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution and United States Supreme Court decisions as legal authority for such a conclusion. It includes ruling of the United States Supreme Court that:
- The interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children - is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this court.
- The Due Process Clause does not permit a state to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child-rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a 'better' decision could be made.
- The State cannot choose means that unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity.
- If there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose ‘‘less drastic means.”
- When a court orders a statewide remedy, there must be at least some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of equal protection and fundamental fairness are satisfied.
In light of these U.S. Supreme Court rulings and recent changes in Wisconsin laws, Raz argues that "The state cannot allow one parent, a mediator, guardian ad litem or a court to minimize, obstruct or interfere with the other’s equal parental role. Wisc. Stat. 767.045(1)(a) 2, 767.045(4) , 767.11(10), 767.11(14) , 767.24(4)(a)2, 767.24(5), and 767.325 (1)(b) allow the state to intrude into the private realm of the family without first requiring a threshold determination as to the unfitness of a parent or that a parent’s placement proposal which maximizes placement of the child with both parents would be harmful to the children. These statutes also have no safeguards that the mediator, placement study evaluator, guardian ad litem or judge must first and foremost strive to support the equal fundamental rights of both parents. Thus they are unconstitutional."
The fact that Wisconsin Attorney General’s office declined the opportunity to defend the constitutionality of these statutes in the Raz case - suggests support for this conclusion.
While Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Michael Goulee ultimately awarded Raz equal placement of his children, the application of these statutory provisions resulted in a legal battle that lasted more than two and a half years, deprived Raz of this right during this period of time, and cost him more than $60,000. And it probably cost his ex-wife an additional $60,000, or more.
"There was no justifiable reason for Wisconsin’s legal system to be so costly and intrusive for two fit parents who live in the same school district to get equal placement," WFCF member Roger Beers points out. "What happened in this case is a violation of Article 1 SECTION 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution which states "Every person ....... ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay ...."
Raz is optimistic that the appeals court will address the fundamental rights issue in a way that supports the equality of fundamental rights and drastically reduces the unnecessary child placement litigation and resultant costs to families and taxpayers in future cases. However, he urges others to continue to raise this issue in their own cases with court commissioners and trial judges. "The courts cannot avoid this issue forever,” he notes. “Sooner or later Wisconsin legal professionals and courts will have to stop being in contempt of fundamental rights and the equality principles protected by the U.S. Constitution and Supreme Court decisions."
To make it easier for others to understand and raise the legal issues in their own cases, a copy of Raz’s brief submitted to the appeals court regarding this issue is available on the internet at http://www.wisconsinfathers.org/prbrief.pdf . "This issue must be raised at the beginning of every placement dispute by all fit parents that want to have an equal parental role with their children," Raz said. "There is no reason for Wisconsin courts to continue to force parents to fight a legal battle to win something that is a fundamental right of all parents ..... something that Wisconsin courts have no right to deny us, without a compelling reason. According to the U. S, Supreme Court, the best interest of the child criteria is not a sufficient legal basis to interfere with a parent’s right to raise his or her child.”
Bryan Holland Wisconsin Fathers for Children and Families Vice President - Legislative Affairs PO Box 1742 Madison, WI 53701 http://www.wisconsinfathers.org 608-ALL-DADS To contact me directly: work: 608-329-4300 home: 608-329-3673 e-mail: bryan@computerheroes.com 1808 16th Avenue Monroe, WI 53566
Children Sold by the Government
If you have a child in your home, please go to the below listed site and read carefully.
This is not just happening in Michigan alone. It’s taking place in your state too...
http://falseallegations.com/michigan.htm Please sign Guestbook on the site
YOUR child could be the next one SOLD by the GOVERNMENT.....
States collect $20,000 from Federal Government for each child they take away from their parents. The taxpayer's tax dollar pays for this to happen without you knowing about it...
FORWARD THIS MESSAGE TO EVERYONE ON YOUR MAILING LIST AND HELP PUT A STOP TO THIS CORRUPTION IN OUR GOVERNMENT.
Tennessee Court upholds alternating custody schedule.
Besides R-Kids of Minnesota, groups in North Dakota and Wisconsin other states are taking up the cudgel in support of the rights of children to have access to both parents. Both Tennessee and Georgia are leaders. Other states, such as Texas, have good visitation laws that keep children from having social problems after a divorce. Minnesota does not, and our high crime rate, high teen age pregnancy rate, large expenditure for family court problems and problems with education reflect this absence of both parents from the lives of the children.
A Tennessee Appellate Court just unanimously upheld a trial court's order that parents have alternating custody! It closely follows the outlines of Childs Best Interest's HB2338, and signals the days are numbered for joint custody legislation which has been the nationwide standard.
This is because as the appellate justices noted, parents in disagreement cannot be joint decision makers. The parents in this case were very much in disagreement, so the trial court divided custody into 6 month blocks for each parent. In essence they each have sole custody, in an alternating and substantially equal schedule.
That's exactly what HB2338 would have done. The primary difference between it and the appellate opinion is CBI's bill has a positive option for parents, where the ruling still leaves it to a judge's discretion to deny a fit parent from having custody. The appellate court though did not preclude a parent from having alternating custody if the trial judge ruled against it.
If properly argued I think they would side with the parent. Indeed, they have to if constitutional protections are raised. Other differences are outcomes under HB2338 should be in longer increments such as 1, 2, or 4 years or once prior to the child reaching majority, it applies to parents who live far apart, and applies to standing cases.
See the section "The Joint and Divided Custody Arrangement" beginning at p.6: http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/TCA/PDF/022/SwettD.pdf
In Tennessee a parent in an initial custody case only need cite this case and constitutional law showing it is the correct outcome, and they should come out as custodian half the time.
For parents in other states and those with cases already decided, HB2338 is a good starting point for introduction into your legislature. See HB2338 at:
http://www.legislature.state.tn.us/bills/currentga/BillCompanionInfo.asp?Bil lNumber=HB2338
Daniel Lee CBI President ACFC Associate Director CRC Member
http://childsbestinterest.org/
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED DECISIONS
Editor’s note: This will most likely be the last newsletter containing summaries by the Minnesota State Bar Association of unpublished decisions, unless I get a lot of emails in favor of continuing to do so. As you can see, these summaries take up 28 pages of what is I believe our longest newsletter ever. These cases do not have any precedential value, but they may be important to you, especially if the facts look similar. And if you are trying to do research, they will usually point you to the relevant published cases with precedential value that you can cite to a court.
Tim Theisen, Esq., RKIDS Newsletter Editor
Ttheisen@bistream.net
Rose vs. Rose, C2-01-1844
{date filed} April 23, 2002
{court} Minn. App. unpublished
{decision} Affirmed
{reviewed by} MSBA
{categories} Custody; Parental Rights
{summary} In this appeal from a custody-modification order
granting respondents-grandparents custody of two of their
grandchildren, appellant-mother argues that (a) the district
court’s order ignored the custody presumption favoring parents;
and (b) the fact that the children were living with respondents
before the modification did not show the extraordinary
circumstances necessary for awarding custody to nonparents.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The parties’ marriage was dissolved in 1994. Appellant-mother was awarded sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ three children, subject to reasonable visitation by father. For six months following the divorce, mother and the children lived with respondents, the children’s maternal grandparents. Mother and the children then moved into another home. Eventually, two of the children returned to live with respondents.
Respondents filed a motion requesting custody of the two children living with them. Mother opposed the motion and sought to have the two children return to live with her. The district court granted respondents' motion, finding that the two children were of sufficient age and maturity to express a preference and that both unequivocally preferred to live with respondents.
The district court found that the appellant-mother loved and cared for all of her children and had not neglected, abandoned, or endangered them in any way. The district court also found that both mother and respondents had the capacity to give love, affection, and guidance to the children and would encourage the level of excellence achieved by the children in school, church, and community.
Appellant argued that the district court’s order ignored the custody presumption favoring parents and that the fact that the two children were living with the respondents before the modification does not show the extraordinary circumstances necessary for awarding custody to nonparents. The Court of Appeals analyzed the case using Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) (2000), and Westphal v. Westphal, 457 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. App. 1990). The Court of Appeals found that the district court made sufficient findings to support a determination that the best interest of the children was served by awarding custody to respondent-grandparents.
In re: Freeman vs. Kobany, C1-01-1317
{date filed} April 23, 2002
{court} Minn. App. unpublished
{decision} Affirmed as modified
{reviewed by} MSBA
{categories} Child Support; Paternity
{summary} Appellant argued that the district court erred in
refusing to allow appellant to withdraw from a stipulation
entered by the parties and that the district court’s judgment
contained terms beyond the scope of the oral stipulation.
The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified.
Respondent (Freeman) gave birth to a child, and a blood test established that it was likely appellant was the biological father, but the paternity action was dismissed. Respondent married respondent (Benavraham), who signed a “Legitimation Affidavit for Child Born Out of Wedlock” form and consented to be named on the child’s birth certificate. After Freeman and Benavraham divorced, Freeman and Ramsey County renewed the effort to determine whether appellant was the child’s father.
A trial commenced but was not completed because the parties purportedly reached a settlement agreement, which the parties read into the court record. Appellant stated on the record that day that he understood the terms of the agreement and that he agreed to abide by them. At a later hearing, Freeman moved the court to adopt the stipulation in the form of her proposed judgment. Appellant appeared pro se and asked the court not to adopt the written agreement, claiming he never agreed to either the oral or written stipulation. The district court declined and entered the judgment.
Appellant first argued that the district court erred in not allowing him to withdraw from the stipulation. The Court of Appeals stated:
When a district court is considering whether to allow a party to withdraw from a stipulation, which has not yet been incorporated into a judgment, the district court should consider whether the stipulation was “improvidently made and in equity and good conscience ought not to stand.” Toughill. ... Stipulations based on fraud or duress and which prejudice or defraud the coerced party are improvidently made and should be vacated. Id. In this situation, the district court may also consider the first two Tomscak factors: (1) whether the party was represented by competent counsel and (2) whether there were extensive and detailed negotiations.
The Court of Appeals rejected appellant’s argument. Appellant stated four times on the record that he understood and agreed to abide by the terms of the agreement as they were read into the record. Appellant was allowed to ask questions regarding the terms of the agreement, and the court allowed time off the record to negotiate the finer points of the agreement. The Court also found there was no evidence that appellant was represented by incompetent counsel.
Appellant next argued that the determination of paternity was unsupported by the record because there were conflicting presumptions of paternity: appellant’s and respondent’s (Benavraham). The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, noting that in the case of conflicting presumptions of paternity, the district court was required to determine which presumption should control by evaluating on the facts which presumption was founded on the weightier considerations of logic and policy. The district court properly did so in this case, noting that although Benavraham once held the child out as his son, he had since divorced the child’s mother and voluntarily relinquished his rights.
The appellant next argued that the judgment was inconsistent with the oral stipulation. The Court of Appeals, in reviewing the record, agreed with the appellant and modified the judgment.
In Re the Marriage of: Davis vs. Davis, C2-01-1553
{date filed} April 23, 2002
{court} Minn. App. unpublished
{decision} Reversed in part and remanded
{reviewed by} MSBA
{categories} Custody; Property Division
{summary} Appellant-mother argues that the district court abused
its discretion by awarding the parties joint physical custody of
their two minor children and made erroneous, inadequate findings
to support such an award. Mother also alleges that the district
court abused its discretion by disproportionately dividing the
parties’ property and by failing to make adequate findings on
property values. The Court of Appeals held that the district
court applied an incorrect legal standard for awarding custody
and made inadequate findings.
Mother and respondent father were married and have two minor children. The children have all been home-schooled in a religious-based program. Mother was primarily responsible for the home-schooling during the marriage, but father also participated.
After separation, appellant-mother made arrangements to enroll the children in public school, but father took the children, refused to let mother have contact with them for several months and began home schooling them himself. Appellant-mother sought a temporary custody order. In response, the district court awarded temporary joint legal and physical custody of the children, with each parent having the children three and one-half days per week. Father continued to home school the children.
Although mother testified that the children were excited about trying public school, the guardian ad litem testified that the children expressed a strong preference to continue home schooling. The guardian ad litem advocated continued contact with both parties as a way to continue to maximize each parent’s involvement with the children. The guardian ad litem recommended joint legal custody for the express purpose of giving father sole control over education and mother sole control over religious training based on the guardian ad litem’s assessment that father is using religion to vilify mother.
The district court awarded sole legal custody of the minor children to mother and awarded joint physical custody to mother and father, with the children continuing to spend three and one-half days of each week with each parent.
Appellant argued that the district court abused its discretion by awarding mother and father joint physical custody of their children because (1) the district court failed to make any of the findings required for an award of joint physical custody; (2) the district court misread the statute governing custody when it determined that joint physical custody is in the best interests of the children; (3) the district court made statements in its memorandum that are not justified by the record; and (4) the district court’s award of joint physical custody of the children to mother and father undermines mother’s role as the sole legal custodian of the children.
The Court of Appeals agreed with appellant’s argument that the district court failed to make the necessary findings for joint physical custody. The Court rejected the district court’s finding that appellant-mother requested joint physical custody by acquiescing in father’s home-schooling of the children. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the district court abused its discretion by applying a rebuttable presumption that joint physical custody is in the children’s best interests.
The Court of Appeals agreed with appellant’s argument that the joint physical custody award rendered its award of sole legal custody to mother meaningless.
In Re the Marriage of: Marich vs. Marich, C1-01-1169
{date filed} April 23, 2002
{court} Minn. App. unpublished
{decision} Reversed
{reviewed by} MSBA
{categories} Child Support; Civil Procedure
{summary} Appellant father challenges (1) the district court’s
1996 support order extending his child-support obligation beyond
his youngest son’s 18th birthday; (2) the child support magistrate’s
2001 order denying father’s motion to terminate his child-support
obligation as of his son’s 18th birthday and to forgive his child-support
arrears calculated after that date; and (3) the district court’s 2001
order affirming the child support magistrate’s decision. The Court of
Appeals reversed, finding that the appeal from a 1996 child-support
order was timely and the district court erred by extending father’s
child-support obligation beyond his youngest son’s 18th birthday.
The parties’ marriage was dissolved with a 1980 Judgment and Decree that ordered father to pay child support “until such time as the minor children reach the age of 18, are otherwise emancipated, legally self-supporting or deceased.” More than 15 years later, mother started contempt proceedings against father for his failure to pay child support. The district court appointed a public defender to represent father regarding the contempt issues. In 1996, a Ramsey County referee made findings on the record that the court would have jurisdiction to proceed with the contempt hearing even after the parties’ youngest child reached the age of 18. The referee asked mother’s attorney to draft an order reflecting the referee’s decision on continuing jurisdiction and then set the date of an evidentiary hearing on the contempt issue.
The signed order, however, exceeded the scope of the issue before the court by ordering father to continue paying child support until his youngest son became legally self-supporting. Mother did not serve father with the notice of filing and entry of the 1996 order but did serve the public defender who represented father with regard to the contempt issues. Father denied having received a copy of the order.
The county sent father a “financial letter” showing father’s child-support. Father immediately moved for an order terminating his child-support obligation and forgiving arrears that accrued after his youngest child’s 18th birthday. Father argued that the order purporting to extend his child-support obligation beyond the child’s 18th birthday was not the result of any motion by mother to extend father’s child support and, therefore, that he was never given an opportunity to oppose such an extension.
Father argued that his appeal was timely because mother failed to properly serve him with the notice of filing and entry of the 1996 order and that mother’s service on father’s public defender in the contempt matter was not effective to limit father’s time for appeal on the underlying support obligation. The Court of Appeals agreed with this argument, stating:
This is the first time we have addressed whether service of a notice of filing on an attorney appointed to represent a party solely with regard to contempt matters is effective to limit the time for appeal from the portion of an order dealing with issues other than contempt. We previously held that service of a notice of filing on standby counsel is not effective to limit the time for appeal. In re Rodriguez, 506 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Nov. 30, 1993). Here, the public defender, representing father on the contempt issues, was not even acting as standby counsel for issues involving the underlying support obligation. Appointed counsel only represented father on the contempt matters and specifically told father that he could not advise him on the underlying support obligation. See Cox v. Slama, 355 N.W.2d 401, 404 (Minn. 1984) (stating that a public defender, appointed to defend a parent in a contempt proceeding for failure to pay child support, may only “represent his client in the contempt proceedings and those narrow, ancillary issues related to contempt only”). Clearly, father represented himself with regard to the child-support obligation.
The Court of Appeals also agreed with appellant’s argument the district court erred in extending the child support obligation beyond the child’s 18th birthday, stating:
But the issue before the court at the July 3, 1996 hearing was the court’s jurisdiction over contempt proceedings after the child reached the age of eighteen, not whether father’s support obligation extended beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday. The order prepared by mother’s attorney and signed by the referee and district court exceeded the scope of the hearing by ordering father to continue to pay child support “as long as the dependent child of the parties is not legally self supporting.” Mother never moved to extend father’s support obligation beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday and father was never given an opportunity to respond to an assertion that his support obligation continued beyond the child’s majority. The decree is not ambiguous. The parties did not stipulate, nor does the decree provide, that father’s obligation would continue beyond the child’s eighteenth birthday.
Nigg vs. Hallock, C7-01-1855
{date filed} April 30, 2002
{court} Minn. App. unpublished
{decision} Reversed
{reviewed by} MSBA
{categories} Civil Procedure
{summary} In this appeal in which both parties are pro se,
appellant-father alleged he was not properly served under
Minn. R. Gen. Pract. 355. 02, subd. 1, with notice of the
child support proceeding that resulted in the order increasing
his support obligation. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Appellant argued that he was not served properly in accordance with Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 355.01 because respondent sent notice by certified mail and the notice was returned to respondent unopened. The Court stated:
Unlike first-class mail, which is simply delivered to an address and left there, certified mail must be signed for or it is returned to the sender. Because the notice was returned to respondent unopened, the notice did not comport with rule 355.02 and was invalid. Therefore, the magistrate lacked personal jurisdiction over appellant and his order is void.
In Re the Marriage of: Ahlers vs. Ahlers, C1-01-1480
{date filed} May 7, 2002
{court} Minn. App. unpublished
{decision} Affirmed
{reviewed by} MSBA
{categories} Child Custody
{summary} Appellant challenged the district court’s determination
that, even though the parties were awarded joint legal custody,
respondent had the sole right to make decisions about the children’s
religious training and their education. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The district court awarded the parties joint physical and legal custody of their two minor children and designated respondent’s household as the children’s primary residence. The district court modified the joint legal custody award by providing that respondent would have sole responsibility for “decisions regarding the children’s religious training and their education.” The court found that from early in the parties’ relationship appellant “has mixed religion and manipulation”; and that the parties are in conflict over the issues of religion and education, with the result that they “cannot cooperate regarding matters of religion or the children’s education.”
The Court of Appeals found that:
The district court did not err in concluding that, based upon the record, it can be inferred that appellant is likely to continue to manipulate respondent in the future as it relates to religion, and that appellant is extending religion into the arena of the educational upbringing of the children to manipulate respondent. The evidence supports these inferences.
Visser vs. Scoles, C3-01-1240
{date filed} May 21, 2002
{court} Minn. App. unpublished
{decision} Affirmed
{reviewed by} MSBA
{categories} Child Support
{summary} In this child support proceeding, appellant alleges
that the district court erred by (1) excluding tax refunds,
and holiday and vacation pay from respondent’s net income;
(2) disregarding appellant’s inability to meet her own monthly expenses;
(3) deviating downward from the child support guidelines without making
findings pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5(c) (2000);
(4) improperly determining respondent’s child support arrearage; and
(5) denying appellant’s request to reopen the record to present
additional evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The parties lived together in the fall of 1991. Their child was born in 1992. Respondent was incarcerated from 1992 until 1997 for an offense unrelated to this appeal. While in prison, respondent married another woman and they have one child. In 2000, respondent first learned that he had a child with appellant. Appellant has sole physical and legal custody of their child. She brought an action under Minn. Stat. § 257.66 (2000) to obtain child support. Respondent sought a downward deviation from the child support guidelines based on his financial obligations to also provide support for his child from the other marriage. The child support magistrate ordered respondent to pay child support, but set the amount at a figure lower than the guideline amount. Appellant sought review of the award in district court, and the court affirmed the order.
Appellant first argued that the district court erred in the calculation of respondent’s income. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument holding that “banked” vacation pay is not income because it is not available. The Court also rejected appellant’s argument that respondent’s income tax refund should have been included in his income. The Court noted that the court may calculate net income by using a tax table to compute standard deductions or may deduct amounts withheld and add amounts refunded in a given year. The Court said that Koury only states that tax refunds are only considered net income in the year in which they are received. In this case respondent did not receive his 2000 tax refund until 2001, and the court appropriately excluded it from his 2000 net income.
The Court of Appeals rejected appellant’s challenge of the child care costs.
The appellant next argued that, when deviating from the guidelines, a court must make specific findings justifying a lesser award pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5(c) (2000). The Court of Appeals stated that Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5(c), addresses deviations from the child support guidelines generally, but Minn. Stat. § 518.551, subd. 5f (2000), specifically addresses child support computations in cases of subsequent children. The court is required to determine an obligor’s total ability to contribute to the support of dependent children, the total needs of all of the obligor’s children, and to make specific findings relating to the needs of the child who is the subject of the action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s findings in this area.
The Court of Appeals also rejected challenges to the award of past support, and the district court’s refusal to reopen the record.
In re the Marriage of: Brown vs. Brown, C4-01-1702
{date filed} May 28, 2002
{court} Minn. App. unpublished
{decision} Affirmed
{reviewed by} MSBA
{categories} Child Custody
{summary} Appellant-father challenges the district court’s modification of
his weekly visitation schedule, alleging that (a) the evidence does not support
the district court’s findings; and (b) the district court’s findings do not
support the extent of the reduced parenting time. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The parties agreed to joint legal custody of their two minor children, with primary physical custody awarded to mother and reasonable and liberal visitation awarded to father. The stipulated visitation schedule included two days each week, with overnights, when father was not working, and one other evening each week. The weekly visitation schedule followed the recommendations of a custody evaluation, which also anticipated that the mid-week overnights might need to be eliminated once the children entered school.
The district court granted mother’s motion to modify the visitation schedule to accommodate the children’s new school schedules. Although father agreed that a visitation schedule modification was required, he brought a counter-motion and proposed an alternative schedule.
Father argued that the district court’s order modifying his visitation to three evenings per week has significantly reduced the time that he sees his children because he no longer has them overnight on the nights that he is not at work. The Court of Appeals disagreed. Insubstantial modifications of a visitation schedule are within a district court’s discretion and need not be supported by findings that such modification is in the children’s best interests. To determine whether a reduction in visitation constitutes a restriction, the court should consider the reasons for the change as well as the amount of the reduction.
In this case, the district court’s visitation modification is not a substantial visitation modification or restriction. Appellant continues to have visitation three evenings each week during the school year, and the weekly visitation schedule during the summer months remains unchanged. The reason for eliminating mid-week overnights during the school year was foreseen at the time of the judgment and decree, and father agrees that a modification is necessary because of the children’s school schedule.
In re: Linda Diane Freeman vs. Joseph Lawrence Freeman, CX-01-2000
{date filed} May 28, 2002
{court} Minn. App. unpublished
{decision} Reversed and remanded
{reviewed by} MSBA
{categories} Child Support, Civil Procedure
{summary} Appellant contended that the district court gave
impermissible retroactive application to an amended statute.
The statutory amendment provides that there is no automatic
reduction of child support when the original judgment fixes
a single sum for multiple children and one or more children
become emancipated. Because the district court’s application
of the amended statute altered a substantive provision of the
judgment, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.
The parties' 1994 dissolution judgment required Appellant to pay a single monthly amount in child support for the parties’ three minor children. In 1995 the parties stipulated to an increase in the support amount, consistent with the guidelines, to be adjusted nunc pro tunc. When the eldest child became emancipated in 1999, Appellant asked the county to reduce his support obligation. The county told him that the support amount could not be automatically reduced, but rather, any reduction would require a court order. Appellant made a similar request of the county and received a similar response in 2001, after the second child bec